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## I.—THE LIMITATION OF THE IMPERATIVE IN THE ATTIC ORATORS.<sup>1</sup>

Raff, the composer of the celebrated Lenore Symphony, happened one day to be taking a walk with a friend of his. In the course of their conversation, the friend made some remarks about the difficulties of musical harmony and counterpoint.

<sup>1</sup>“Contempt solves no problems” is a wise saying that I have tried to bear in mind under sore temptation throughout the course of my grammatical studies, and I have never joined heartily in the Homeric laughter or un-Homeric guffaw which is always evoked when the name of Protagoras is cited in connection with the doctrine of the moods and the use of the imperative in Homer. Indeed, I have considerable respect for the first professor that attacked the subject of Greek syntax, and should continue to have considerable respect for him, even if I were left to form my notion of Protagoras from the mime of the great prose Archilochus, Plato. Aristotle, to whom we are indebted for the Protagorean criticism of Homer, is an unsympathetic soul, and his report is an unsympathetic one: *τί γὰρ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ ὅτι εὐχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν μὴ νῦν ἄειδε θεά; τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπιτάξις ἐστίν* (Poet., c. 19). But even Aristotle does not deny that the criticism may have cogency in another sphere, and adds: *διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὃν θεώρημα*. Surely, any one who knows aught of the potency of the professional *eidolon* might see that Protagoras was under the spell of his own art, and judged Homer as he would have judged an oration; and a glance at the *prooemia* of extant orations will suffice to show to any one who is not too busy in asserting his own superiority by an idle laugh, that the rule which Protagoras applied to Homer is perfectly applicable to the orators. The mistake of Protagoras is no worse than the mistake which such a critic as Dionysios makes when he applies his rhetorical rules to such a master-workman in history as Thukydides. This absence of the imperative from

"Why," said Raff, "that's a simple matter. I can teach you the principles in a very few minutes." Now, in view of the large number of books on musical harmony, each claiming to possess merits of its own in the presentation of so difficult a subject, such a statement would seem paradoxical. But, as a matter of fact, to the initiated, the whole system of harmony resolves itself into a few elementary principles, and it is only facility in the practical application of these principles that involves the expenditure of considerable time and energy.

Similarly in the case of the subject under consideration, the theory is stated clearly enough by Hermogenes,<sup>1</sup> but the application of his dictum to the study of the stylistic effect of the imperative is not so simple a matter. Difficulties very soon present themselves, apparent exceptions are encountered, and we are brought face to face with a multitude of seemingly isolated facts. Yet as we progress and, by long-continued contact with the imperative, acquire a keen perception of its varying tone, the difficulties are cleared away, the facts no longer appear isolated, and the apparent exceptions are shown to be but so many striking confirmations of the rule.

To study the limitations of the use of the imperative, that are necessarily involved by its harshness, one naturally turns to oratory. In epic poetry and in the drama, it is true, the imperative abounds, but there is a perpetual shift of character and of situation, and the advantage, possessed by oratory, of the utterance of only a single individual, is lost. Comedy is further complicated by all the elements of mockery and travesty, and there is great danger of misinterpretation of facts. In lyric poetry, as in Pindar, we have, it is true, only one speaker, but the elements of ecstasy

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oratorical *prooemia* has for many years intensified my desire to have a full and accurate exhibit of the use of the imperative in the orators, and at my suggestion Dr. Miller has undertaken to fill this gap in our knowledge, and has filled it in his own way. In view of the widespread phenomenon of varying expression for command and prohibition, I should be inclined to lay more stress than he does on the psychological elements involved, but that reserve does not affect the importance of his research nor the suggestiveness of his presentation.—B. L. G.

<sup>1</sup> See Spengel, *Rhet. Gr. II*, p. 300, or Walz, *III*, p. 237: *σχήματα δὲ τραχέα μάλιστα μὲν τὰ προστακτικά· οἷον τῆς Ἀριστογείτονος κρίσεως ἀναμνησθέντες ἐγκαλῆσασθε. . . . κῶλα δὲ τραχέα τὰ βραχύτερα* (hence also imperative forms) *καὶ ἂ μὴδὲ κῶλα, κόμματα δὲ καλεῖν ἄμεινον.*

and surprise defy ordinary rhetoric, and in didactic poetry, while there is, of course, an abundance of imperatives, there is too much sameness. In history the material would be scant if it were not for the speeches and other quotations, and the artistic form of philosophy, the dialogue, is subject to dramatic conditions. But in oratory the case is different. Here rhetoric holds full sway, and the nature of the case in the majority of instances is such as to require considerable tact on the part of the writer in the proper handling of the imperative. A harsh imperative may seriously prejudice the effect of an oration. And yet there is not so little of the imperative found as to make the conclusions drawn therefrom practically useless.

The results of this study are presented in about the same order in which the various problems have been solved in the mind of the writer. The arrangement may not be the most logical one possible, but it is at least a practical one. It is very difficult to hit upon a perfectly satisfactory arrangement in the case of a subject, every part of which depends for its proper understanding upon a knowledge of all the other parts. We consider the oratorical limitation of the imperative—

1. As to *number* and *kind*.
  - a.* No. of imperatives in entire body of orators. Substitutes. Omission of imperative. Imperatives addressed to jury. Kinds of imperative. Mollifiers. Recurrence of same verb. Cumulation of imperative.
  - b.* Variations in the different departments of Greek oratory.
  - c.* Variations in authors.
  - d.* Variations in individual speeches.
2. As to *form*. Voice. Person. Positive and Negative. Tense.
3. As to *position*.
  - a.* Prooemium.
  - b.* Body of speech and epilogue.

## I.

At first blush it would seem that whilst imperatives could hardly be dispensed with altogether in most orations, yet if, as Hermogenes says, the imperative is harsh, we should not be likely to find in them a large number. An examination, however, reveals the fact that (excluding interjectional *φέρει*'s, but of course including

μή with the aor. subjunctive in prohibitions) there are 2445<sup>1</sup> imperatives on the 2284 solid Teubner prose pages<sup>2</sup> that remain of the Attic orators, after deducting the fragments, the letters, all of Hyperides, and the Demosthenean collection of prooemia. 2445 is not a small number. Indeed, if no other facts were taken into consideration, the results of the mere count would hardly justify the belief in the harshness of the imperative, and Hermogenes might be suspected of having based his opinion on a few examples that had attracted his attention by their particularly objectionable character. But figures are valuable chiefly by comparison. While 2445 is a large number, the bulk of the orators, as pointed out above, is likewise large, and *one* imperative per page does not, after all, seem an inordinately large proportion.

It must further be borne in mind that the imperative might have been used much more frequently. For we find in the orators scores of instances of substitutes for the imperative, each instance representing the avoidance of an imperative and bringing about a diminution in the number of occurrences. The cause of the avoidance need not always be harshness of *tone*; it may be harshness of colon, harshness of rhythm, desire of symmetry, but generally most or all of these elements are combined. The following are some of the actually occurring substitutes: *δέομαι ὑμῶν*, *δεῖ*, *χρή*, *ἄξιος* and *δίκαιος* used personally, *δφείλω*, *προσέκει*, *εἰκός*, *αἰτοῦμαι*, *ἄξιῶ*, *ἄξιον*, *δίκαιον*, *συμφέρε*, *αἰσχρόν* w. inf.; *εἰκότως*, *δικαίως* *ἄν* w. opt.; *ἐάν* with subjunctive or *εἰ* with optative; the verbal in *-τέον* and *ἔργον* with the genitive or the possessive pronoun followed by the infinitive.

Probably, of all the substitutes given above, the conditional sentence looks furthest removed from an imperative, and yet

<sup>1</sup> This makes about 107 imperatives to every 100 pages, or about 1 imperative to every page. The first six books of the Iliad contain at least 230 imperatives on less than 124 Teubner pages of epic poetry. This makes about 185 imperatives to every 100 pages. Now, taking into account the fact that a page of epic poetry is smaller than a page of prose, it would be perfectly safe to say that, volume for volume, the number of imperatives in the first six books of Homer's Iliad is about twice as great as that in the orators. In the case of the orators, the imperatives in quotations, in supposed laws, and in bracketed portions of the text, as also all doubtful imperatives, have been excluded from the count.

<sup>2</sup> All laws and bracketed portions of the text have not been counted. In case of fractions of lines, one-half or over has been counted as one full line, and less than one-half line has not been counted.

Isocrates himself tells us in 15, 72: ἐπιχειρῶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο πείθειν αὐτὸν ὡς χρὴ δεινὸν νομίζειν, that εἰ δεινὸν ἡγήσαιο of 2, 14 is a substitute for the imperative. For, in proof of the fact that χρὴ δεινὸν νομίζειν is a substitute for the imperative, if proof be necessary, we need only turn to the previous section, §71, where Isocrates, referring to the expression in 2, 10: καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ταῦτα δυνησομένους καὶ περὶ τηλικούτων βουλευομένους μὴ ῥαθυμεῖν, impersonal and indefinite as it is, says παραινῶ τῷ Νικοκλεῖ μὴ ῥαθυμεῖν. If the impersonal δεῖ followed by the infinitive, with the subject in the third person, may be a paraenesis to the person addressed, and if εἰ with the optative may be hortative, it is not necessary to prove that the other expressions may be substitutes for the imperative. Not that they are the exact equivalents of the imperative; but the intimation of the desire that the thing should be done is there, and the object sought to be attained is the same as in the case of the imperative, whilst the appearance of wishing to lord it over one (ἐπιτάττειν) is removed and an appeal is made to the person, either directly or indirectly, from the point of view of mercy, kindness, justice, fairness, propriety, utility, moral obligation, absolute necessity, etc.

To an entirely different sphere belong the use of the so-called imperative question and the imperative use of ὅπως with the future indicative. These are not mollifying substitutes for the imperative. ὅπως with the future indicative is undoubtedly colloquial, as the statistics given by Weber, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Absichtssätze*, II, p. 123, plainly show, and it has no extended use in oratory. It is found only twelve times—twice in Lysias, once in Isaeus, and nine times in Demosthenes—and of these twelve instances only one is directly addressed to the body before whom the oration is delivered. The passage is found Dem. 4, 20. The orator begins ξένους μὲν λέγω and then, suddenly breaking off, stirs up his hearers by the vigorous parenthesis: καὶ ὅπως μὴ ποιήσεθ' etc. How much more effective this than an entreating μὴ ποιήσηθ'!<sup>1</sup>

The use of the so-called imperative question is best studied in connection with the other kinds of rhetorical questions. Its tone

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Rehdantz ad locum: "man erwartet nun die Anzahl zu hören; aber bekannt mit der Leichtfertigkeit und Spottsucht seiner Mitbürger, welche eine so feierlich angekündigte und doch so bescheiden lautende Forderung lächelnd würden bewilligt haben, schlägt er ihnen zuvor durch die *bittere* Parenthese den Spott aus der Seele und reinigt so zu sagen erst die Gemüther zu der richtigen Stimmung."

varies all the way from mild astonishment to utter impatience and intense disgust. Says Rehdantz in a note to Dem. 4, 10: "Der Charakter dieser Frage ist ein wesentlich anderer als in der zu §2 behandelten. Hier strömt sie aus der unwillig erstaunten Seele des Redenden, und ihr Ziel ist Ueberführung<sup>1</sup> (ἐλεγχος Tiber. 8, 540, πᾶσις ἐλεγκτική Hermog. 3, 314) und Beschämung, welche zum Entschluss oder Handeln führen sollen und oft geradezu wie ein *Befehl* wirken; nur dass sie immer doch den Hörer als ein sich selber frei bestimmendes Wesen anerkennen." See also Rehdantz-Blass, Index to Dem., under "Frage." Hermogenes, Walz, III, p. 237, calls this kind of question ἐλεγκτικός and makes it only second in degree of harshness, the imperative holding the first place. The shortness of the colon, or rather comma, as Hermogenes would have it, also figures prominently in the harsh effect produced (cf. Hermogenes, p. 237 bottom and p. 238 top). The following are about all the instances that we have noted in which such a question might, with more or less change in the sentence, be replaced by an imperative of the second person. No claim to exhaustiveness, however, is set up, and no attempt has been made to register the various degrees of harshness: Lys. 14, 17; Isae. 3, 77; Dem. 19, 283 (*bis*); 20, 83 (*bis*); 21, 116 (*sexies*); 222 (*bis*); 23, 109; 24, 170 (*bis*); 203; 205; 25, 27; 53 (*bis*); 63; 36, 52 (*bis*); [44], 54; 45, 70; 54, 20; [59], 108; 117; Lycurg. 27 (*bis*); 54; 78; 115; 116; 121; Aeschin. 1, 130; 185; 2, 161; 3, 152 (*bis*); 235 (*ter*); 253 (*bis*); Din. 1, 15; 18; 37; 41; 42; 84; 87; 97; 106 (*ter*); 107; 2, 11 (*ter*); 14 (*bis*); 15; 3, 7 (*bis*).

It has just been shown that the number of the imperatives in the orators was considerably reduced by the use of mollifying substitutes. But there is another way in which the number might have been diminished, and that is by intentional or unintentional omission, without replacement by a substitute. But this is a matter that is not directly susceptible of proof. The mere absence of a construction does not prove that the nature of the construction is responsible for the conscious or even unconscious avoidance of it on the part of the author. And while, from the general behavior of the imperative as described in this article, it would seem that the nature of the imperative is such as to have caused its absolute omission on many occasions, yet it is hardly fair to utilize any such conclusion before all the evidence has been presented.

<sup>1</sup> I should prefer to take ἐλεγχος in the sense of *reproof* and not *conviction*.

In dealing with the actually occurring imperatives it is necessary, first of all, to distinguish between the persons to whom the imperative is addressed. It is perfectly evident that the imperatives addressed to one's adversary or to the clerk of the court, etc., do not enter prominently into the discussion. The clerk is the servant of the court, and there can be no harshness in addressing him in the imperative. Even Isocrates uses forms like *ἀνάγνωθι*, *κάλει*, etc. The common forms used in speaking to the clerk are *ἀναγίγνωσκε* (48 times), *ἀνάγνωθι* (134 times), *ἐπίλαβε* (11), *ἐπίσχε* (15), *κάλει* (114), *λαβέ* (162) and *λέγε* (256 times).<sup>1</sup> These imperatives are occasionally replaced by the third person imperative, which in this case would seem rather harsher than the second, inasmuch as spoken in the presence of the person to whom the request ought to be addressed. A more common substitute is the future. So instead of *κάλει τοὺς μάρτυρας* we have *τούτων τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέξομαι*. Instead of *ἀνάγνωθι* we find *ἀναγνώσεται*. In the same way, an *ἀνάβηθι* or *ἀνάβητε* addressed to the witness or witnesses is unobjectionable. The adversary seems to have been a perfectly legitimate object upon which to vent one's wrath. It is the person or persons to whom the oration is addressed whose feelings must be consulted, and so it is only the imperatives addressed to him or to them that are of primary importance. Now, of the 2445 imperatives mentioned above, the entire number of imperatives directly<sup>2</sup> addressed to the jury or substitute is only 1311. In judging of the significance of this number we must bear in mind that not all imperatives are of the same degree of harshness.

It may be read in every grammar that the imperative may be used to express a command, an exhortation, or an entreaty. In the genuine command we have an example of unmitigated harshness. There are no examples of this use among the imperatives addressed to the jury. Of the hortative, symbouleutic and paraenetic imperative we shall speak at full length below. Suffice it for the present to say that the greater number of imperatives belong to this class and that they vary in harshness according to the circumstances of the case. But a large number of the imperatives belong to the class of entreaty. When the imperative is used in an entreaty it has of course nearly lost all harshness of

<sup>1</sup> This and the foregoing figures include the few cases in which the one or the other of the just mentioned imperative forms does not refer to the clerk.

<sup>2</sup> The handful of imperatives indirectly referring to the jury either collectively or individually, may be ignored for present purposes.



tone. Moreover, two or more imperatives of entreaty are frequently used together, and even these are generally accompanied by some mollifying expression, so that the short, harsh colon that is characteristic of the imperative is avoided. The mere insertion of the phrase  $\delta$  ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι has a mollifying effect upon the tone of the imperative. An instance of a string of imperatives of most pitiful entreaty is found in Dem. 28, 19-20:  $\mu\eta\delta\alpha\mu\omega\varsigma$   $\delta$  ἄνδρες δικάσται γένησθ' . . .  $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon$  . . .  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\iota}\delta\eta\tau\epsilon$  . . .  $\beta\omicron\eta\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\tau'$  οὐν ἡμῖν  $\beta\omicron\eta\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\tau\epsilon$  . . .  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha\tau'$  ἐλεήσατε . . .  $\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ , ἀντιβολῶ πρὸς . . . .  $\mu\eta$   $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\iota}\delta\eta\tau\acute{\epsilon}$   $\mu\epsilon$ ,  $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon$   $\pi\omicron\iota\acute{\iota}\eta\sigma\eta\tau\epsilon$   $\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}$ . The introduction of a word like  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ ,  $\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ , ἀντιβολῶ, or a combination of these words, leaves no doubt as to the true tone of the imperative. These words occur with the aorist and present, positive and negative. The following are examples: Aeschin. 3, 61  $\delta\epsilon\acute{\eta}\sigma\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$  . . .  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ , ἐπινεύσατέ μοι.—3, 156  $\mu\eta$  . . . ,  $\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$  ὑμᾶς,  $\mu\eta$   $\tau\rho\acute{\omicron}\pi\alpha\iota\omicron\nu$  ἴστατε . . . ,  $\mu\eta\delta'$  αἰρεῖτε . . . ,  $\mu\eta\delta'$  ὑπομνησκατε.—And. 2, 23  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$  . . . ἀπόδοτε.—Dem. 19, 195 αἰτῶ  $\sigma\epsilon$  καὶ  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ , δός μοι.—[42], 19  $\mu\iota\kappa\rho\acute{\nu}\nu$   $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  οὐν,  $\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ , ἐπίσχεσ.—[42], 32 ἄφετε,  $\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$  πάντας ὑμᾶς.—45, 85  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$  καὶ ἀντιβολῶ καὶ  $\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$   $\mu\eta$  ὑπερίδῃτέ  $\mu\epsilon$ ,  $\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}$ .—[50], 2  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$  ὑμῶν  $\mu\eta$   $\mu\epsilon$  ἡγήσῃσθε.—[50], 2-3  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$  . . .  $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$   $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\eta\sigma\iota\nu$  . . . ἀναμνήσῃτε καὶ . . . φράζετε.—Lys. 4, 20  $\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$  ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀντιβολῶ, ἐλεήσατέ  $\mu\epsilon$ . I desire in this connection to call attention to the frequency with which many of the imperative forms are repeated.<sup>1</sup> Constant recurrence would have a tendency to blunt the feeling of harshness on the part of the hearer. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the group of imperatives of the verbs σκοπεῖν, σκέψασθαι, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι and λογίζεσθαι. But, apart from their mere recurrence, there is another reason why these last-mentioned forms are rather mild. The plaintiff or the defendant knows that it is the duty of the judges to challenge mentally every statement he makes. It is expected of him to meet this challenge, and the most simple and direct way of introducing the arguments in support of his statement is the σκέψασθε or some similar expression, which in this case has almost the force of a simple causal particle. If we add to these weakest of hortative imperatives such closely related words as the

<sup>1</sup> It might be interesting to know that the whole number of imperative forms in the orators is about 667. These belong to 373 different verbs, which in turn are referable to 228 simple verbs. The whole number of imperative forms second plural (not all of which, it must be remembered, are addressed to the jury) is 318, and the number of verbs of greater or less difference of signification to which these belong is 229. The number of simple verbs to which these 229 different verbs may be referred is 147.

imperatives of *θεωρεῖν*, *θεᾶσθαι*, *δρᾶν*, *νομίζειν*, *οἶεσθαι*, *ἡγείσθαι* and a few others, we have disposed of about one-half of all the imperatives addressed to the jury or person to whom the oration is addressed.

Contrary to the tendency of avoiding the imperative, there is at times discernible a tendency to multiply its use. The explanation of the heaping up of two or more different imperatives in or about the same passage has in part been given on p. 406. The matter will be perfectly clear after the discussion, in Part III, of the position occupied by the imperative in the speech. Analogous to the heaping up of several different imperatives, but much more restricted in its use, is the repetition of the same imperative by anadiplosis. Aristophanes has made us familiar with this phenomenon by his *παῖε*, *παῖε τὸν πανοῦργον κτέ.*, Eq. 247. Its use would be governed by the general laws of anadiplosis. The tone is that of great excitement, extreme passion or deep pathos. Hence there is little occasion for its use in the orators. For the rhetorical effect and for examples of anadiplosis in general, see, in addition to Volkmann, *Rhetorik d. Griech. u. Röm.*, Rehdantz' note to Dem. 2, 10 and Rehdantz-Blass' index under *Ἐπαναδιπλωσις*. To the example for the imperative there given, namely, Dem. 28, 20 *βοηθήσατε*, add Dem. 18, 139 *δότε*; 19, 97 *εἴργετε*; 25, 14 *δότε*; Aes. 3, 202 *κάλει* (parallel with the *παῖε*, *παῖε* of Aristophanes); and Din. 1, 29 *μὴ ἀφῆτε*.<sup>1</sup> Compare also Dem. 19, 46 *μὴ νῦν—μὴ νῦν ἀφίστασο* (cited by Rehdantz-Blass, l. c.), Aeschin. 3, 156 *μὴ . . . μὴ . . . ἴστατε*, and Din. 1, 85 *μή, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μή*.

Essentially different is the repetition of *λέγε* in such passages as Dem. 18, 37 *ὅτι δ' οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει, λέγε μοι τό τε τοῦ Καλλισθένους ψήφισμα καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τοῦ Φιλίππου ἐξ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἅπαντ' ἔσται φανερά. λέγε*. In this and similar cases the order to state the decree, law, etc., is issued to the clerk, but instead of allowing him to act in obedience to the order at once, the speaker goes on talking at greater or less length. Meanwhile the clerk is naturally waiting for the signal to start, which is eventually given by the *λέγε*. Examples of this anaphoric use of *λέγε* are common enough in Demosthenes, but none have been noted in the other orators, excepting Aeschines 2, 61, where *λέγε* resumes a preceding *παράγωνθι*, and Din. 1, 52, where *λέγε* resumes *λαβέ*. It must, how-

<sup>1</sup> Wurm, *Comment. ad Din.*, p. 130, does not mention this example among his collection of instances of anadiplosis in Dinarchus, and Mätzner's text has *μὴ ἀφῆτε* but once. Blass, *Thalheim* and Bekker repeat the *μὴ ἀφῆτε* in their texts.

ever, be borne in mind that while the imperative forms ἀνάγνωθι, ἀναγίγνωσκε, κάλει, λαβέ, ἀνάβηθι and ἀνάβητε, and ἀκούσατε are more or less freely used in Andocides, Isocrates, Isaeus and Lysias, the imperative form λέγε is found but once, namely, Lys. 10, 16 (Lys. 1, 18 contains the λέγε in a quotation), and Antiphon, who cites no laws, decrees, etc., in calling up his witnesses, uses only the expressions παρέξομαι, παρασχέσομαι and κάλει. Examples of λέγε—λέγε are Dem. 18, 28 (but second λέγε is omitted in S according to Weil); 37; 73 ("A et vulg. Ce mot a été omis dans S, L, F par suite, sans doute, du déplacement de la phrase qui le précédait." —Weil); 105; 115; 155; 212 (λέγε resumptive of λέγε in 211); 221 (λέγε resumptive of λέγε in 218); 289; 19, 38; 40; 63; 86 (particularly long parenthesis); 168? (Bekker, but neither Blass nor Weil); 20, 95 (*bis*); 21, 113; 23, 88; 159 (second λέγε omitted in S, according to Weil, and not found in Blass' text; it certainly is missed here); 160; 24, 41? (Bekker; but there is serious trouble about reading); 41, 28; [58], 9? (Bekker). Instances in which a λέγε resumes a preceding ἀνάγνωθι are Dem. 18, 118; 19, 270 (λέγε bracketed by Blass); 23, 151; 162; 45, 8. Cf. also Aeschin. 2, 61 and Din. 1, 52, cited above.

There is a similar but less common use of ἀνάγνωθι and ἀναγίγνωσκε, and this is not confined to Demosthenes. An imperative more rarely precedes, as in Isae. 2, 13 ἀνάγνωθι—§16 ἀναγνώσεται—ἀνάγνωθι; 3, 15 ἀνάγνωθι—ἀναγίγνωσκε; Dem. 24, 32 ἀνάγνωθι—ἀναγίγνωσκε; Aeschin. 2, 60 ἀνάγνωθι—ἀνάγνωθι. The future is more common, as in Isae. 3, 53 ἀναγνώσεται—ἀναγίγνωσκε; 5, 2 μάρτυρας παρεξόμεθα—ἀνάγνωθι; 6, 7 ἀναγνώσθησεται καὶ οἱ παραγενόμενοι μαρτυρήσουσι—ἀνάγνωθι; 6, 8 παρέξομαι—ἀνάγνωθι; Dem. 24, 39 ἀναγνώσεται—ἀναγίγνωσκε; 27, 8 παρέξομαι—ἀναγίγνωσκε; [47], 24 παρέξομαι—ἀνάγνωθι. Cf. also Isae. 2, 16 above.

We have up to this point confined our discussion to the use of the imperative in the orators viewed as a unit. Let us now examine the variations of its use in the different departments of Greek oratory. We prefix a table showing the comparative frequency of the imperative in the different departments of Greek oratory.

TABLE FOR DEPARTMENTS.<sup>1</sup>

1. λόγοι ἐπιδεικτικοί.					
Lysias 2 <sup>2</sup> and 33,	0	0	18.25		
Isoc. 9-13,	5	8	118.73		
Dem. 60 and 61,	13	14	24.97		
Total,	18	22	161.95	11	14
Dem. 61 (paraenetic),	12	12	14.75		
Balance,	6	10	147.20	4	7
2. λόγοι συμβουλευτικοί.					
And. 3,	8	11	11.63	69	95
Lys. 34,	0	0	2.25	0	0
Isoc. 1-3 (paraenetic),	197	201	36.82	535	546
Isoc. 4-8 (with epid. turn),	16	25	160.54	10	16
Dem. 1-11 } symbouleutic,	71	97	161.20	44	60
13-17 }					
3a. λόγοι δικανικοί ιδιωτικοί.					
Lys. 10. 11. 17. 23. 32,	14	30	19.53	72 <sup>3</sup>	154
Isoc. 16-21,	16	34	62.76	25	54
Isaeus (entire),	48	149	127.79	38	117
Dem. 27-59,	193	571	433.06	45	132
3b. λόγοι δικανικοί δημόσιοι.					
Ant. (all),	43	51	73.38	59	70
And. 1. 2. 4,	34	59	58.16	58	101
Lysias (remainder, exc. 34),	129	181	179.93	72	101
Dem. 18-26,	310	644	436.29	72	148
Lycurg.	21	41	39.81	53	103
Aeschin. (all),	136	243	178.82	76	136
Din. (all),	39	55	45.72	85	120

Of the three great departments of Greek oratory, the epideictic is represented chiefly by Isocrates. Ps.-Lys. *ἐπιτάφιος* (2) and Lys.

<sup>1</sup> The first column gives the number of imperatives directed to persons addressed; the second the entire number of imperatives; the third the number of solid Teubner prose pages; the fourth the percentage (number of imperatives per 100 pages) of the first column; and the fifth the percentage of the second column. Isoc. 14 and 15, [Dem.] 12, and Hyperides were excluded from the count for evident reasons.

<sup>2</sup> It was found impracticable to distinguish between spurious and genuine speeches.

<sup>3</sup> This number, owing to the inadequate material upon which it is based, has no special significance.

Ὀλυμπιακός (33), Ps.-Dem. ἐπιτάφιος (60) and ἐρωτικός (61), and Hyp. ἐπιτάφιος are the only extant specimens of show speeches from the rest of the Attic orators. On purely epideictic soil there is but little room for the imperative. The Greek eulogy, or its counterpart, the invective, usually remains true to its name. While there was every temptation for exhortation or for administering a bit of friendly advice, yet the narration of glorious deeds,<sup>1</sup> the recounting of excellent qualities, formed the principal object of the encomium, and the paraenetic part, if not entirely wanting, receives but little space, the advice being given in an indirect way. This gives the speech an air of dignity and reserve entirely appropriate to the occasion. The use of the direct imperative second person would betoken a certain amount of familiarity and personal interest, and hence we are not surprised to find a few imperatives in the funeral oration of Pericles, Thuc. 2, 35-46, and in an imitation of it in Plato, Menex. 236 D-249 C, though in the latter the dead are ingeniously made responsible for all the advice there given. I was curious enough to know how the imperatives in all the extant funeral orations of the classic times ran, and so present the results of my investigation.

*Imperatives in funeral orations.*—Gorgias ἐπιτάφιος. Cf. Blass, Attische Bered. I<sup>2</sup>, p. 61. We possess one large fragment and probably several smaller fragments. There is no imperative in the larger fragment.—Thuc. 2, 35-46, Pericles' funeral oration. §43, 4 ζηλώσαντες καὶ . . . κρίναντες, μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους. §44, 4 ἡγείσθε . . . καὶ . . . κουφίζεσθε to such of bereaved parents as are too old to have any more children. §46, 2 νῦν δὲ ἀπολοφυράμενοι ὃν προσήκει ἕκαστος ἀποχωρεῖτε. There are a number of substitutes for the imperative. The length of the oration is 7.19 Teubner pages.—Ps.-Lys. ἐπιτάφιος. No imperative.—Plato, Menex. 236 D-249 C. Length about 15.38 pages. 247 A πειρᾶσθε; ἴστε; 247 C τοῖς μὲν οὖν παισὶ ταῦτ' εἰρήσθω; 249 C ἀπολοφυράμενοι ἄπιτε. There are quite a number of imperative substitutes.—Ps.-Dem. ἐπιτάφιος. §12 μηδεὶς δ' ἡγείσθω; §37 ὑμεῖς δ' ἀποδυράμενοι καὶ τὰ προσήκονθ' ὡς χρὴ καὶ νόμιμα ποιήσαντες, ἄπιτε.—Hyper. IV, 6 (7), 14 καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ με. No imperative in the epilogue, but χρὴ θαρρεῖν is a substitute.—The Evagoras of Isocrates, which is considered a λόγος ἐπιτάφιος by Volkmann, contains a single imperative.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dem. 20, 141 on the nature of the funeral oration: ἐπὶ τοῖς τελευτήσασιν δημοσίᾳ ταφὰς ποιείσθε καὶ λόγους ἐπιταφίους ἐν οἷς κοσμεῖτε τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα (Bekker's text).

But the epideictic speech may be paraenetic or symbouleutic, and in such cases we may be at a loss as to how to classify. So the first eight speeches of Isocrates have all of them an epideictic stamp, and yet they are plainly paraenetic and symbouleutic. So the *ἐρωτικός* of Ps.-Dem. is largely paraenetic. We of course expect to find imperatives in a speech the main object of which is to give advice—a small number if the advice is given on one or two points only, a large number if a line of conduct is to be laid down. Accordingly, we find a very large number of imperatives in the first three speeches of Isocrates. It is self-evident if one is asked to give advice, one could hardly fairly be accused of harshness for using the imperative in compliance with the request. Yet even here the advice given might not be pleasant to the person seeking it, and in anticipation of this might be couched in a milder form. But different is the case with a self-constituted adviser. Unsought advice rarely meets with favor on the part of the old and receives but a doubtful welcome on the part of the young. There are exceptions, of course, and nobody will blame Isocrates for giving advice that was probably very badly needed. But Isocrates even here betrays his gentlemanly spirit, his good judgment and his refined taste for elegant expression by many a skilful evasion of an otherwise legitimate imperative. I need only remind the reader of the striking example from *πρὸς Νικοκλέα* discussed in the early part of this paper.

For a study of the imperative in the purely symbouleutic speeches, Demosthenes is about the only orator to whom we can turn. For of the speeches of Andocides, only oration 3 is a genuine specimen of the *γένος συμβουλευτικόν*, and of Lysias we have only the fragmentary oration 34. Isoc. 4–8<sup>1</sup> have an epideictic turn, and the number of imperatives is almost as low as in the purely epideictic class. The imperative, as we have seen in the previous section, has a perfectly legitimate place in the symbouleutic speech. The very name points to the imperative. But it must also be borne in mind that public orators are really self-constituted advisers. It is true that the better class of them look upon their work as a solemn duty they owe to their country, and this consideration, together with a greater or less degree of popularity, serves to mitigate the otherwise unpardonable harshness of the imperative. But the fact remains that they have not been appointed public counsellors, and their own personal interest,

<sup>1</sup> For 1–3 see above.

as well as the public welfare, would make them desirous of having their advice meet with favor. So a certain amount of caution must be exercised as to the way in which the advice is offered, and, as a matter of fact, there are only 44 imperatives addressed to the jury, in every 100 pages of this kind of Demosthenean speech. The expression *φημι δεῖν* abounds, and other substitutes for the imperative are not wanting. It is interesting to note the comparatively small number representing the total of all the imperatives in this class. This is due to the absence of witnesses, citations of laws, etc., the presence of which calls forth imperatives like *ἀνάγνωθι, κάλει, λέγε*, etc.

The third great class, that of the *λόγοι δικανικοί*, remains. Here we must again divide into two classes, the public and the private. In the private orations the number<sup>1</sup> of imperatives is very much below the average for all the orators, whereas in the public speeches the number is almost as much above. In the latter class the avowed interest of the speaker in the public welfare made the imperative excusable, and frequently the length of the speech gave ample time for gradually working upon the feelings of the audience, and when their passion was fully aroused, the orator might give vent to his. Cf. Cic. Orat. §26 on Dem. 18.

It is only after the above study of the relative frequency of the imperative in the different departments that we can at all understand the figures for the different authors. For else how could we account for it that Lysias "venustissimus ille scriptor ac politissimus," who, according to Cic. Orat. 29, has nothing "inso-lens aut ineptum," should use so many imperatives? A glance at the table of departments shows that the vast bulk of Lysias consists of *public* judicial speeches, and in this department Lysias' figures are as low as those of Demosthenes.<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes here runs up to 72, while in his private orations he descends to 45. Isaeus' low number is explained by the fact that all his orations are private and of the class called *κληρικοί*. Dinarchus, the *κρίθινος Δημοσθένης*, abounds in imperatives and heads the list. This is perfectly consistent with his use of the so-called imperative question,<sup>3</sup> where he also leads. Next comes Aeschines, who has

<sup>1</sup> For the rest of this paper, unless otherwise specified, the *number* of imperatives is to be regarded as referring simply to the imperatives addressed to jury, etc.

<sup>2</sup> But the shortness of so many of Lysias' orations must also be taken into consideration. See below, p. 414.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 404.

a high temper and is by no means free from vulgarity. Isocrates must justly be placed at the end of the list, notwithstanding the fact that the table assigns him the number 53. The number of imperatives in his epideictic and symbouleutic speeches (excluding paraenetic) is a minimum. For the private speeches his number is the lowest. It is the paraenetic speeches that swell his proportion of imperatives. We append the following

TABLE FOR AUTHORS.<sup>1</sup>

	Ant.	And.	Lys.	Isoc.	Isae.
Pages,	73.38	69.79	219.96	467.29	127.79
Effective imperatives, <sup>2</sup>	43	42	142	249	48
Do. per 100 pages,	59	60	65	53	38
Ivs. 3d person,	6	6	14	26	17
Other ivs. 2d person,	2	22	55	20	84
Total number of ivs.,	51	70	211	295	149

	Dem.	Lycurg.	Aesch.	Din.	Total.
Pages,	1061.46	39.81	178.82	45.72	2284.02
Effective imperatives, <sup>2</sup>	591	21	136	39	1311
Do. per 100 pages,	56	53	76	85	57
Ivs. 3d person,	130	3	35	..	237
Other ivs. 2d person,	609	17	72	16	897
Total number of ivs.,	1330	41	243	55	2445

Besides this variation in the departments and in the different authors, there is also considerable variation in the number of imperatives of the individual speeches of the same author or of the same department. This variation will depend on a variety of circumstances, and no definite rules can be laid down. In general it may be said that timidity is unfavorable to the use of the imperative, and so we might expect to find more imperatives used by the accuser than by the defendant. So in *περὶ παραπρεσβείας*, where Aeschines is on the defensive and is in great alarm, he is forced to assume a modest and humble tone, which is indicated by the use of only 45 imperatives per 100 pages. This modesty and humility are conspicuously absent in his first oration, in which 84 imperatives per 100 pages are used, and still more so in the *κατὰ Κτησιφώντος*, in which the number per 100 pages rises to 91. In the opposing speeches of Demosthenes we find precisely the

<sup>1</sup> It was found impracticable to distinguish between spurious and genuine speeches.

<sup>2</sup> For the sake of brevity this term is used in referring to the imperatives addressed to the jury or the person to whom the oration is addressed.



same state of affairs. In the *de corona* Demosthenes is on the defensive and uses only 42 imperatives per 100 pages, but in the *περὶ παραπρεσβείας*, where he is the accuser, he uses 95 imperatives per 100 pages. Calmness is hardly compatible with the extensive use of the imperative, but a passionate or a pathetic<sup>1</sup> speech would naturally abound in imperatives. Here again it is to be remembered that a speech may be calm at one point and passionate at another. An awkward and inexperienced speaker might in his *naïveté* use imperatives where a more experienced and clever speaker would avoid them. Furthermore, a short speech would in proportion contain more imperatives than a long one of the same kind. All these things have to be taken into consideration for a proper understanding of the number of imperatives in any one speech. For the sake of supplementing and further illustrating the above remarks, there is added the table on p. 415.

## II.

In the treatment of the limitation of the imperative in regard to form, very little need be said about voice and person. The imperative passive occurs but rarely, and then chiefly in the third person. There are only two or three instances of real passives of the second plural addressed to the judges. As far as person is concerned, it is to be remarked that there are only 237 instances of the third person, and of these only a small number refer to the jury. In regard to the tone of imperatives of the third person, it would probably be safe to say that while, as a rule, such imperatives, because less direct, are less harsh than those of the second person, yet they were not used as mollifying substitutes. Of very much greater importance is the question of the tone of the *negative*. This question has been pretty thoroughly discussed by Prof. M. W. Humphreys in his paper on Negative Commands in Greek, published in the Transactions of the Am. Phil. Association for 1876, p. 46 ff. Though the views there set forth on the tone of the negative imperative would seem, upon the whole, to be untenable, it is but due to Prof. Humphreys to say that his interesting discussion of the matter proved both suggestive and stimulating to the writer, and has been of considerable service in the formulation of the results presently to be given.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the string of imperatives in the pathetic appeal of Dem. 28, 19-20. See above, p. 406.

TABLE FOR INDIVIDUAL SPEECHES.<sup>1</sup>

Ant.	2	3	And.	Lysias.	2	3
7.06 14	.50 0	2.06 97	38.06 63	9.22 43	10.06 139	2.00 250
2.22 0	2.81 142	1.94 52	7.91 76	16.56 0	7.72 13	19.16 89
3.19 63	3.22 93	2.56 78	11.63 69	8.88 45	3.91 0	19.31 67
2.44 123	2.38 120	25.19 71	12.19 33	3.66 109	3 56 84	9.69 31
2.69 74	1.28 0	13.84 14	.. ..	1.06 0	5.34 131	2.34 85
Lysias.	5	6	7	Isoc.	2	3
4.63 43	5.09 20	5.38 74	6.88 87	11.88 783	26.25 11	11.47 35
2.25 89	4.59 65	2.97 67	6.88 0	9.56 607	19.22 5	67.00 0
5.38 56	3.06 0	3.66 27	1.69 0	15.38 299	33.41 3	5.66 0
11.94 118	5.41 166	2.69 0	2.25 0	45.38 0	19.13 5	14.06 36
7.06 99	8.09 25	7.59 132	.. ..	36.28 30	15.47 0	74.38 13
Isoc.	5	Isaeus.	2	3	Dem.	2
12.13 8	4.47 22	11.00 82	14.91 7	14.03 14	7.19 42	7.88 38
14.28 21	.. ..	10.59 47	10.91 18	.. ..	8.03 25	9.75 21
15.00 27	.. ..	17.88 34	12.53 31	.. ..	9.16 131	16.84 53
12.16 33	.. ..	7.22 83	9.19 98	.. ..	12.94 54	17.28 29
4.72 64	.. ..	12.56 8	6.97 29	.. ..	5.81 0	17.59 45
Dem.	4	5	6	7	8	9
5.31 75	7.63 0	57.66 82	6.94 72	3.66 55	15.53 103	7.94 113
5.94 67	7.50 13	21.78 64	18.41 22	7.47 0	13.44 22	8.84 23
9.13 88	77.75 42	59.53 74	6.09 197	10.22 88	7.38 27	18.03 50
10.22 29	90.47 95	52.31 44	15.63 26	13.19 61	10.47 57	17.16 23
8.94 45	43.72 94	26.13 65	9.53 0	11.84 34	15.31 105	21.28 80
Dem.	11	12	13	Lycurgus.	Aeschin.	Din.
6.13 131	5.53 18	12.84 78	14.75 81	39.81 53	52.16 84	32.38 83
19.38 10	9.34 11	18.19 66	.. ..	.. ..	50.91 45	7.50 107
14.22 35	7.84 0	18.94 27	.. ..	.. ..	75.75 91	5.84 68
17.09 17	12.66 16	32.72 24	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..
18.38 22	8.38 60	10.22 98	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..

The whole number of imperatives in the orators, as pointed out above, is 2445. Of these the number of negatives is about 384, or a little less than 16 per cent. Of the effective imperatives, the number of negatives is 21 per cent. That this small proportion of prohibitions is not due to any greater inherent harshness of the negative command as compared with the positive, but to the fact

<sup>1</sup> For the sake of saving space the figures are arranged in rows of blocks of five, the first column of each block giving the length in solid Teubner pages, the second column the number of effective imperatives per 100 pages. For information regarding the authenticity, etc., of the different speeches, the reader must be referred to Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, and to Blass' text edition of Demosthenes.

that there was no occasion to use the negative more frequently, would appear from the following considerations. To the Greek mind there seems to have been no difference between command and prohibition. "τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι," says Protagoras, according to Aristotle, poet., §19, "ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπιταγὴς ἐστίν." In the same way, there is no difference to our mind. Whatever distinction is made is a logical one, and not one of tone. A positive imperative may, according to circumstances, be more harsh or less harsh than a negative imperative. To measure the effect of an imperative, three things must be taken into consideration—the person who issues the command, the person to whom the command is directed, and the thing commanded. In the case of the person commanding, the most important item is the spirit that prompted the use of the imperative. If the tone was an imperious one, the imperative, whether positive or negative, meant that the command was to be executed simply because the master (would-be or real) so ordered it, and, as far as the person using it is concerned, is a harsh imperative. If the tone is simply hortative, the imperative is less harsh, and if suppliant entreaty characterizes the imperative, all harshness must be lost, so far as the speaker is concerned. In the case of the person to whom the command is issued, the most important point is again the spirit with which he receives the command. If his be a mind that will endure no imposition, if he be self-willed or of a rebellious spirit, or if he be a brute annoyed by even the most pitiful entreaty, every form of the imperative will be harsh. Lastly, other things being equal, a thing that is easy to do will be less disagreeable, if commanded, than a thing that is hard to do. If the above remarks are true, the conclusion would be that, other things being equal, the negative is not harsher<sup>1</sup> than the positive, and other things being *unequal*, the negative may be harsher than the positive, or the positive harsher than the negative. The view that the orators had no occasion to use prohibitions more frequently seems further to be confirmed by the facts we could gather regarding the use of the positive and the negative imperative in other authors. In the first six books of the Iliad about 230 imperatives (excluding ἄγε unless real imperative) were counted, and of these 37, or 16 per cent., are negatives. In

<sup>1</sup> Aken, *Modus u. Tempus im Griech.*, p. 32, top, is still more radical. He says: "die Beschränkung auf das *Verbot* rührt daher, dass eine Aufforderung etwas *nicht* zu thun, nicht eines so starken Ausdrucks bedurfte, als die positive, die erst in Bewegung setzen soll."

Xenophon's *Anabasis*, according to Joost, *Sprachgebrauch Xenophons in der Anab.*, there are 144 positive imperatives and only 11 prohibitions. So of the 155 imperatives, only 11, or 7 per cent., are negatives. According to Wagner, *Gebrauch des Imperativischen Infinitivs im Griech.*, there are in the *Iliad* 76 imperative infinitives of the second person and in the *Odyssey* 123, and of these 12 and 10, or a little less than 16 per cent. and a trifle more than 8 per cent. are respectively negative. That there are large numbers of prohibitions in Hesiod's *Works and Days* and in *Theognis* does not militate against our view. The frequent use of prohibitive forms in didactic poetry is to be expected. It is the duty of the adviser not only to tell his friend what to do, but also, by a timely word of warning, to caution him against making the same mistakes he himself has made or seen others make.<sup>1</sup> Isocrates, who knows how to avoid a harsh imperative, is fond of the balance of positive and negative imperative, as his large use of μή—ἀλλά in the speech to Nicocles shows. In the third speech of Isocrates, Nicocles gives his subjects a good deal of fatherly advice as to what they must not do, and in oration 6, one-half of Archidamos' exhortation is in the negative. Of the ten commandments, two are positive and eight negative. The truth is, virtue is a simple thing, but vice a many-headed monster, and the above only shows that, except in admonitions, the negative imperative is not generally of frequent occurrence. As far as the harshness of the form, apart from its meaning, is concerned, we should be inclined to say that the negative, because less short, would be less harsh than the positive. It might be well to note, in passing, that in the orators the negative is used by preference with certain imperatives, while it rarely occurs with others. This is of course due to the circumstances of the case. So positive forms of ἀκούειν occur 61 times, but negative forms only four times. Positive forms of ἀναγιγνώσκειν occur 185 times, but there is no occasion to use a single negative. Positive forms of σκοπεῖν and σκέψασθαι together occur 225 times, while negative forms are found only three times. Of ἐνθυμεῖσθαι only positive forms are used. On the other hand, περιορᾶν is used only in the aorist subjunctive with μή. Of ἐπιτρέπειν only prohibitive forms are used. The imperative of εἶναι is used overwhelmingly with the negative, etc.

<sup>1</sup> τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ is faced by τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ, Plat. Protag. 325 D; *hoc facito* by *hoc ne feceris*, Cic. Div. 2, 61, 127.—B. L. G.

Intimately connected with the consideration of the negative is that of the use of the tenses. The rule for prohibitions in Attic Greek is to use  $\mu\eta$  with the present imperative or  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive, though, exceptionally,  $\mu\eta$  with the third person of the aorist *imperative* is found. This at once leads to the question as to why this curious distinction is made in the construction of positive and negative. Various answers have been given. The investigators that have treated the matter from an exclusively psychological point of view, however widely divergent their views may otherwise be, agree in stating that  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive is a milder form of prohibition than  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist imperative. Delbrück seems to be about the only one that has attacked the problem from the historical side, and his results have been accepted without modification by Vogrinz, *Gram. des hom. Dialektes*, p. 269. Monro, *Homeric Grammar*, 2d ed., §328, thinks that Delbrück's conjecture is a highly probable one, and Brugmann, *Griech. Gram.*, §168, referring to Delbrück, remarks: "Dass man gewöhnlich nicht  $\mu\eta$   $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\omicron\nu$ , sondern  $\mu\eta$   $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\eta\varsigma$  sagte, hing vielleicht mit dem Ursprung des Ausgangs - $\sigma\omicron\nu$  zusammen." The curious behavior of  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive in prohibitions in Homer first seriously attracted the writer's attention to the historical side of the question, and as the matter has a direct bearing on the subject under discussion, he begs leave to present his results. To Delbrück, whose account of the origin of the prohibitive constructions under consideration differs materially from that presented in the following pages, grateful acknowledgment is made for the valuable service derived from his *Altindische Syntax* in the course of this special investigation. To Professors Gildersleeve and Bloomfield special thanks are due for the encouragement received by the writer while working out this side of the question, and the present opportunity is gladly seized of thanking Prof. Gildersleeve for the many valuable suggestions by which this entire paper has been benefited. Prof. Bloomfield has also had the kindness to read the manuscript of this portion of the article, and the writer has profited greatly by his friendly criticism.

The main points of Delbrück's view regarding the origin of the imperative use of  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive are stated by him, *Syntakt. Forsch.* IV, p. 120, as follows: "Es diene also wahrscheinlich der Imperativ ursprünglich nur der positiven Aufforderung, bei negativen Aufforderungen gebrauchte man *mā* mit

dem unechten Conj. Im ältesten Sanskrit hat sich dies Verhältniss erhalten, im Griechischen dagegen dehnte sich, da der gesammte Imperativ (erster und zweiter Schicht) als eine einheitliche Formation empfunden wurde, die Verbindung mit  $\mu\eta$  von der zweiten Schicht, bei der sie überliefert war, auch auf die erste aus. Da nun der Imperativ präs. von allem Anfang an im Griechischen eine geläufige Form war, so befestigte sich als dauernder Typus die Konstruktion von  $\mu\eta$  mit dem Imper. präs. Der Imper. aoristi dagegen war, wenn die oben angedeutete Hypothese Grund hat, im allerältesten Griechisch so gut wie nicht vorhanden. Man musste desshalb beim Aorist um ein Verbot u. dgl. auszudrücken, zum Conjunctiv mit  $\mu\eta$  greifen, und so entstand als ein zweiter fester Typus  $\mu\eta$  mit dem Conj. aoristi. Als nun der Imperativ aoristi später häufiger wurde, war der Conjunctiv-Typus schon so eingelebt, dass ein Imperativ mit  $\mu\eta$  fast garnicht dagegen aufkommen konnte. Es scheint mir also, dass die Bevorzugung des Imperativs im Präsensstamme und des Conjunctivs im Aoriststamme keinen logischen, sondern einen historischen Grund hat." There are two points in the above theory that seem particularly objectionable. The first is that while the existence of the aorist imperative is virtually denied for the earliest period of Greek, the need of an aorist form of prohibition is asserted. Or, if the view as expressed Syntakt. Forsch. I, p. 20 f. be preferred, a severe critic might be prone to detect a slight inconsistency between the two statements "der auffordernde Conjunctiv aber würde, wie das Sanskrit zeigt, mit dem Imperativ wesentlich gleichbedeutend gewesen sein, er ist also im Griechischen aus Streben nach klarer und deutlicher Ausdrucksweise abgeschafft worden" and "Was zunächst die Sätze mit  $\mu\eta$  betrifft, so beruht die Verbindung von  $\mu\eta$  mit dem Conjunctiv des Aorist auf einer vorgriechischen Gewohnheit, sie stammt aus einer Zeit, in der höchst wahrscheinlich ein Imperativ vom Aoriststamme noch nicht, oder wenigstens erst in schüchternen Anfängen vorhanden war." The second objectionable point is the assumption that the aorist imperative barely existed in the earliest period of Greek. As this is the essential point of Delbrück's theory, an attempt will, in the first place, be made to show that the aorist imperative is probably anterior to the present imperative and that it is certainly at least as old.

When the manifold uses of what Brugmann calls the Injunctive are considered and the facts of its history in Sanskrit are carefully

weighed, the view that the oldest mass of this injunctive represents, if not the oldest, yet at least the largest part of the oldest forms of the verb, appears highly probable (Delbrück, *Altind. Syntax*, §205). These oldest forms of the verb, according to this view, "designated only the connection of an action with a person, without reference to tense and mood, and, according to circumstances, they might express a present, a past, or a postulated (subjunctive-imperative and future) action." See Thurneysen,<sup>1</sup> *K. Z.* 27, 173. Compare also Brugmann, *Morphol. Unters.* III, p. 11 (bottom), and Thurneysen, *l. c.*, p. 174. Now "Avery has shown that numerically even in AV, the aorist preponderates until in P,<sup>2</sup> and that, in connection with the particle *mā*, it is almost all that is left of the injunctive" (Delbrück, *l. c.*, §204), and in classical Sanskrit, while the *present* imperative is all there is left of the imperative, not *mā* with the *imperfect* injunctive, but *mā* with the *aorist* injunctive survived, and that in spite of the general breaking down of the aorist tense. From this the inference may justly be drawn that the oldest aorist injunctives constituted the oldest mass of the injunctive and that the imperfect injunctive was merely an analogical formation that did not have vigor enough to live.<sup>3</sup> From these very ancient aorist forms of the injunctive and by the side of them, other forms of the verb were developed. The development may have been about as follows: Presents were differentiated by various processes of expansion, and, by means of the augment or similar syntactical device, or simply the absence of what had come to be considered distinguishing characteristics of the presents, the original forms became preterits. In some cases the simple form of the present was retained, and so we have forms like *φημί* and *ἔφην* in Greek; in other cases the process of expansion went on, the simpler form of the present was lost, the longer form being retained, and so a present *δίδωμι* is found by the side of an aorist *ἔδομεν*, a present *βαίνω* with aorist *ἔβην*. By the time that another past had been formed from these longer presents by the use of the augment, or secondary endings or other means, the perfect had probably been introduced, and, for that matter, may be as early a form as the present. Other modes of forming the aorist were adopted, and

<sup>1</sup> Thurneysen states that the theory is not essentially new.

<sup>2</sup> Delbrück's notation for Vedic prose.

<sup>3</sup> Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, 2d ed., §779 a, speaks of the aorist and perfect tenses as though it were an established fact that they are older tenses than the imperfect.

their augmentless forms were by analogy used as injunctives. The subjunctive came into use as a more transparent mode of designating futurity and other modal relations that were represented more vaguely and less exclusively by the injunctive. The optative made its appearance. Injunctives, as has been pointed out above, were formed from the imperfect tense after the analogy of the aorist, etc., etc.

But whatever may have been the precise order and the exact processes of these developments, there must have existed in the very earliest times some form of the imperative, a mode of the verb as indispensable as the indicative itself. It is true, the injunctive originally expressed indicative and other modal relations, and it was also used as an imperative. Compare the imperatives  $\sigma\chi\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\varsigma$ ,  $\delta\acute{o}\varsigma$ , which, according to Brugmann (*Griech. Grammatik*, §143), are injunctive forms. But this imperative use of the injunctive is to be regarded simply as on a par with the imperative use of the present indicative that is so common in German, e. g. "Du giebst ihm das Messer," "Du liest mir das Buch," and at the side of these injunctive-imperative forms there must have been shorter forms, forms that lacked the personal ending, forms that held the same relation to the verb that the vocative holds to the noun (cf. Brugmann, l. c., §144, 1). Furthermore, the forms in  $-\theta\iota$  and in  $-\tau\omega$  date back to Indogermanic times (cf. Brugmann, *ibid.*). If the above reasoning be correct, the priority of the aorist imperative as compared with the present imperative is an established fact, and Thurneysen's view (*K. Z.* 27, p. 175) in regard to the origin of the imperative termination  $-\sigma\upsilon$  appears very plausible indeed. Compare, however, Brugmann, §144, 3, last section. The great antiquity of the aorist imperative, to say the least, cannot be disputed; for a string of what would universally be conceded to be genuine aorist imperative forms is found in the RV. and the older Sanskrit literature. But it is important, in this connection, to note the fundamental difference between the Sanskrit and the Greek in the life and growth of the moods and tenses. In the case of the Sanskrit, there is a levelling influence at work, and some of the superfluous material is discarded. So, among other things, classical Sanskrit has lost the aorist (Whitney, l. c., §826) and the perfect (§780) imperative. In Greek, on the other hand, there is manifested a desire for variety without redundancy. The result for classical, and even for earlier Greek, is a most highly developed system of mood and tense usage. There is a full



complement of present and aorist imperative forms, and even the perfect is not wanting. There appears to be nothing in the history of the aorist imperative in Greek that would argue in favor of a later origin of the aorist. This tense of the imperative is fully developed in Homer, and even *-σον* forms are frequent enough. Moreover, some aorist forms go back to Indogermanic times. *ιδέ*, *λαβέ*, *εὔρε*, *εἰπέ* and *ἐλθέ*, for instance, have retained the original accent, and *κλῦθι* equals the Sanskrit *śrudhí*.

If, as has been shown above, the aorist imperative existed at a very early time, the question arises as to why *μή* with the aorist *subjunctive*, and not *μή* with the aorist *imperative*, is used for aorist prohibitions. The solution of this problem is to be found in the Sanskrit use of *mā* with the injunctive. It has been pointed out before that while it is true that there was an injunctive of the imperfect in Sanskrit, and *mā* was by analogy used with that tense also, yet the aorist always preponderated, and when the injunctive had practically died out in the oldest prose, *mā* with the aorist injunctive survived, and was about all there was left of that mood (see Delbrück, *Altind. Synt.*, §§204 and 205), and even in classical Sanskrit, amid the general decline of the aorist tense (Whitney, *Sanskrit Gram.*, 2d ed., §§600 *a* and 826) and the extension of the uses of *mā*, *mā* with the aorist injunctive was a more favorite form of prohibition than *mā* with the present imperative (cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit. Synt.*, §353). It is this *mā* with the aorist injunctive that is undoubtedly the origin of the Greek *μή* with the aorist subjunctive. Classical Sanskrit lost the injunctive and the subjunctive, but clung to its *mā* with the aorist injunctive. The Greek merged the injunctive and subjunctive, which were closely related, and *mā* with the aorist injunctive became *μή* with the aorist subjunctive. The Greek might have lost this peculiar prohibitive construction, but could never have transferred it to *μή* with the aorist imperative. It yet remains to show the growth of *μή* with the present imperative and give the reason for the practical exclusion of *μή* from the aorist imperative.

Grassmann's observation that *mā* is never used with the imperative in the Veda led Delbrück, *Syntakt. Forsch.* IV, p. 120, to the conclusion that the imperative was probably originally confined to the expression of positive commands. This conclusion becomes almost a certainty when by the side of Grassmann's observation is placed the statement of Delbrück, *Altind. Syntax*, §206, that in Vedic Sanskrit no certain example of the pure

imperative in negative sentences can be found.<sup>1</sup> But in a living language the particle  $\mu\eta$ , which was originally confined to the injunctive (Delbrück, l. c., §267), must gradually have found its way into the imperative and elsewhere limited the scope of the other negative particle. Hence we find in classical Sanskrit  $m\ddot{a}$  with the so-called pure imperative, with the optative, and even with the future indicative (cf. Speijer, Sanskr. Synt., §353 and elsewhere). In Greek we not only find that  $\mu\eta$  has become the regular negative of a number of clauses other than direct prohibitions, but we can even watch the encroachment of  $\mu\eta$  on  $\sigma\upsilon$ .<sup>2</sup> As for the imperative,  $\mu\eta$  acquired full sway over the present and perfect, but so tenacious of life was  $m\ddot{a}$  with the aorist injunctive, and so vigorous was its growth on Greek soil in the form of  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive, that, by the side of it,  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist imperative could lead but a miserable existence. Homer's  $\mu\eta \xi\nu\theta\epsilon\omicron$  (*bis*) may possibly be an example of a possible confusion between present and aorist imperative, and the majority of examples in the orators may be regarded as attempts at a more forcible mode of expression.

Prohibitive  $\mu\eta$  with the present subjunctive in independent sentences either never existed in Greek to any considerable extent, or it was swept away by the overwhelming flood of  $\mu\eta$  with the present imperative. Indeed, one can hardly keep from thinking that in Homer  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive was in imminent danger of perishing in the same deluge. For of the 209<sup>3</sup> prohibitions (counting only imperatives and subjunctives) in the Iliad and Odyssey, only about 8 per cent. are aorist subjunctives or aorist imperatives, whereas in the Attic orators the percentage of aorist prohibitions is 44.

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note in this connection that in Hebrew also the imperative cannot be used in negative sentences, but that instead  $\text{לֹא}$  with the jussive or voluntative, or  $\text{לֹא}$  with the imperfect, must be used in prohibitions (cf. Ewald, Lehrbuch der Hebr. Spr., 1870, pp. 584 and 798; Gesenius, 22d ed., §§46 and 127 c).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aken, Lehre von Temp. u. Mod., p. 226, and Gildersleeve, Encroachments of  $\mu\eta$  on  $\sigma\upsilon$  in Later Greek, A. J. P. I, p. 45 ff.

<sup>3</sup> The figures in detail are as follows: I. ILIAD. A. 2d person: 87 pres. iv.; 4 perf. iv.; 7 aor. subj. (E 684; I 33; 522; O 115; Ψ 407; Ω 568; 778); 2 aor. iv. (Δ 410  $\mu\eta \xi\nu\theta\epsilon\omicron$ ; Σ 134  $\mu\eta\pi\omega \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\delta\acute{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\omicron$ ). B. 3d person: 22 pres. iv.; 2 pf. iv.; 1 aor. iv. (II 200  $\mu\eta \tau\iota\varsigma \lambda\epsilon\lambda\alpha\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\theta\omega$ ).—II. ODYSSEY. A. 2d person: 58 pres. iv.; 4 perf. iv.; 3 aor. subj. (γ 55; λ 251; ο 263); 1 aor. iv. (ω 248  $\mu\eta \xi\nu\theta\epsilon\omicron$ ). B. 3d person: 15 pres. iv.; 1 pf. iv.; 1 aor. subj. (χ 213  $\mu\eta \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\iota\pi\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ ); 1 aor. iv. (π 301  $\mu\eta \tau\iota\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\sigma\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$ ).

If the above theory of the development of  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive be correct, the origin of the construction is not a psychological one, but an historical one, and in so far at least Delbrück's conclusion coincides with the one here given. But this does not in the least militate against the greater mildness of  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist *subjunctive* as compared with the various forms of the imperative. The fact that  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive is a *subjunctive* construction, and the fact that it is generally a longer form than the present or the aorist imperative, would make it by nature a milder form than other imperative forms. But how far this natural mildness asserted itself in the practical needs the construction had to meet is another question. Unfortunately, we possess no minutely graded *trachytetometer* that might enable us to tell at a glance the precise degree of harshness of any particular form. Careful and extended observation is the only means at our disposal. When  $\mu\eta$  with the present imperative is regarded by one good authority as differing from  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive chiefly in this, that the former refers to an action going on, the latter to a future action, when a second authority regards  $\mu\eta$  with the present imperative as more modest than  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive, a third considers the two as practically equivalent in many cases, and a fourth regards  $\mu\eta$  with the present imperative as harsher than  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive, there is ample excuse for not attempting to give the exact difference of degree of harshness between the two forms.

The difference between the tone of the present imperative positive and that of the aorist positive is also largely a matter of special conditions rather than one of general rule. There can be no doubt that some aorist forms are more disagreeable in sound than presents. Then, too, the aoristic notion might make the aorist in some cases a more vigorous imperative than the present. But, on the other hand, there are some presents of a more disagreeable sound than the corresponding aorists, as, for example,  $\lambda\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\alpha\epsilon$  and  $\lambda\alpha\beta\acute{\epsilon}$ ,  $\alpha\nu\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\epsilon$  and  $\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\nu\omega\theta\iota$ , and the present may by its weight constitute a more vigorous imperative than the aorist. The aorist seems to have been the favorite form in prayers. Cf. Gildersleeve, Justin Martyr, p. 137; "As in the Lord's Prayer, so in the ancient Greek liturgies, the aor. imper. is almost exclusively used. It is the true tense for 'instant' prayer." It is curious to note, in this connection, the tenses of the word  $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ . The aorist imperative occurs five times in the orators—

twice in Demosthenes and three times in Lysias. The present imperative is used only in the negative; namely, three times in Lysias. The positive is the imperative of entreaty (aorist), the negative is the hortative. Attention has already been called to the fact that all the four imperative forms—to wit, the present imperative, positive and negative, the aorist imperative positive and *μή* with the aorist subjunctive—are found as imperatives of entreaty, and are found so marked by the use of *δέομαι* or some similar expression. See above, p. 406. The relations of the tenses in mass are as follows:—The total number of imperatives, as stated above, is 2445. The entire number of real perfects is only seven. The entire number of presents and aorists is 2438, and of these 1105, or 45 per cent., are aorists. The entire number of prohibitive forms is 384, and of these 168, or 44 per cent., are aorists. The entire number of effective imperatives is 1311, and of these 587, or 45 per cent., are aorists. The entire number of effective prohibitive forms is 281, and of these 129, or 46 per cent., are aorists. It appears that the proportion of aorists is about the same in each of the four cases, and the tense relations for the orators may be formulated as follows: *The relative proportion of present and aorist is the same for positive and negative commands.*<sup>1</sup> Of the 168 negative aorists, 133 are *μή* with the aorist subjunctive 2d person, 29 are *μή* with the aorist subj. 3d person, and 6 are *μή* with the aorist imperative 3d person. The forms of the third person of the subjunctive are as follows; *ἀκούση* (*bis*); *ἀποσπερήσῃ*; *ἀχθεσθῇ* (*ter*); *εἴπῃ*; *ἐξαπατήσῃ*; *ἐξέλῃται*; *ἐπιτιμήσῃ*; *θαυμάσῃ* (*bis*); *θορυβήσῃ* (*ter*); *καταγνῶ*; *νομίσῃ*; *ὀργισθῇ*; *παραστῇ*; *πέλῃ* (*ter*); *ὑπολάβῃ* (*septies*). The six instances of *μή* with the aorist imperative 3d person are *ἀπογνώτω*, Aes. 3, 60; *γενέσθω*, Ps.-Dem. 42, 31; 49, 1; *δότη*, Dem. 19, 77<sup>2</sup>; *ἰσχυσάτω*, Isae. 9, 35; *καταγνώτω*, Aes. 3, 60. Besides these six examples, there are five instances in a law quoted by Aeschines in 1, 19–20; namely, *ἀρξάτω*, *εἰπάτω*, *κηρυκευσάτω*, *πρεσβευσάτω*, *συνδικησάτω*<sup>3</sup>; and *γενέσθω* occurs Dem. Pr. 35. Dem. 27, 59 (see below) is only an apparent instance. The

<sup>1</sup> The word *command* is of course intended to include exhortations, entreaties, and the like.

<sup>2</sup> *μή*—*μή* δότη.

<sup>3</sup> “*συνδικησάτω* Rsk. Br. Bk. Bens., *συνδικήσῃ* abmopqr et pr. h (Di.), *συνδικάσῃ* corr. h, *συνδικάσῃ* Vat. Laur., *συνδικασάτω* g, *συνδικήσάτω* (άτω in erasis) F, *συνδιοικησάτω* Abb., *συνδικῆσαι* BS. Fr.”—Schultz. Schultz himself reads *συνδικησάτω*.

writer has not examined the letters of Aeschines, those of Demosthenes, and the fragments of the Attic orators for this construction. Of μή with the aorist imperative 2d person no genuine examples have been found. The following *apparent* examples have been noted:—I. Aorist imperative followed by μή—ἀλλά: Aes. 3, 153 γένεσθε (v. l. γίνεσθε) δὴ μοι μικρὸν χρόνον τὴν διάνοιαν μὴ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ καὶ νομίσαθ' ὁρᾶν κτέ. καὶ λογίσασθε κτέ. Aes. 3, 168 ὑμεῖς δ' ἀντιθέντες ἑκάτερα τούτων θεωρήσατ' αὐτὸν, μὴ ὁποτέρου τοῦ λόγου ἀλλ' ὁποτέρου τοῦ βίου ἐστίν. Cf. Dem. 27, 59 εἰ μὲν γὰρ βέλτιόν φησιν εἶναι μὴ μισθωθῆναι τὸν οἶκον, δεῖξάτω μὴ διπλάσια μὴ δὲ τριπλάσια μοι γεγεννημένα ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀρχαῖά μοι πάντ' ἀποδομένα.—II. Aorist imperative preceded by μή—ἀλλά: Aes. 1, 161 μὴ γὰρ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενον ἀλλὰ γινόμενον τὸ πρᾶγμα νομίσαθ' ὁρᾶν. Aes. 1, 193 μὴ οὖν εἰς ἀθρόους ἀλλ' εἰς ἓνα ἀποσκήψατε καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς συνηγόρους αὐτῶν παρατηρεῖτε.—III. Aorist imperative preceded by μή μόνον—ἀλλὰ καί: Aes. 3, 255 μὴ μόνον τοῖς ὦσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὤμμασι διαβλέψαντες εἰς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλευσασθε τίνες ὑμῶν εἰσιν οἱ βοηθήσοντες κτέ.—IV. Aorist imperative followed by καὶ μή: Ant. 5, 71 ἀλλὰ πρότερόν γ' εἶ βουλευσασθε καὶ μὴ μετ' ὀργῆς καὶ διαβολῆς. Dem. 18, 265 ἐξέτασον τὸν νυν παρ' ἄλληλα τὰ σοὶ κάμοι βεβιωμένα, πρῶως καὶ (om. Σ) μὴ πικρῶς, Αἰσχίνῃ. In every one of the above examples the aorist imperative, at the moment of its employment, is conceived as a positive, and is so uttered by the speaker. The aorist imperative is as little to be supplied with the μή in the above cases as the aorist subjunctive is to be supplied with ἀλλά in Dem. 51, 10 καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐπιτιμήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, πικρὸν εἶναι νομίσας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὸ ἔργον αὐτὸ πεποιηκόσι.<sup>1</sup>

### III.

In the discussion of the limitation of the position of the imperative in the speech, the prooemium is the part of the oration that first comes up for consideration. The three great objects of the prooemium are summed up in the short sentence *ἔργον προσιμίον εὖνοια πρόσξις εὐμάθεια*,<sup>2</sup> and of these the securing of the good-will is justly put first. There may be cases in which the good-will of the auditors is a matter of no serious moment to the speaker,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also Krüger, §67, 10, A. 3: "An manchen Stellen gehört ein dem Verbum nachgesetztes μή, wenn auch wegen der Form desselben gewählt, doch eigentlich zum nächstfolgenden Worte. . . . σκοπεῖτε μὴ τοῦτο εἰ τάλαντον ἔδωκεν ἀλλὰ τὴν προθυμίαν, Δη. 20, 45."

<sup>2</sup> Anon. in Spengel, Rhet. Gr. I, p. 321.

but in the vast majority of the orations that have come down to us from classical antiquity it formed a matter of considerable importance and sometimes of vital importance, and it is needless to say that to the rhetorical artist it must ever be an object of concern to make a good impression at the outset. Hence, while *τραχυτής* may sometimes be a convenient means of producing *πρόσεξις*, and while it may occasionally be a short road to *εὐμάθεια*, yet, in general, everything harsh must be avoided at the beginning of the speech. That this was the feeling of the ancient speech-writers themselves, and not simply a speculation of the rhetoricians, is clearly proved by Demosthenes. In the celebrated prooemium of the *de corona* the orator distinctly states that he wishes to say nothing harsh at the beginning of the speech—*οὐ βούλομαι δυσχερὲς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου* are his words. If it be true, then, that, as a rule, a good prooemium should be characterized by the absence of harshness, it would follow that, theoretically at least, the imperative ought, as a rule, to be excluded from the prooemium. An investigation of the extant prooemia of the Attic orators shows that the theory is borne out by the facts, and it is at this point that Hermogenes' dictum on the harshness of the imperative receives a most beautiful vindication. In the 156<sup>1</sup> speeches of the ten Attic orators there are 11 speeches with real or supposed gaps at the beginning, so that there remain only 145 prooemia. These, together with the prooemium of Lysias' Erotikos in Plato's Phaedrus, the prooemium of Lys. *πρὸς Αἰσχίνην*, the three prooemia of Lysias preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the three prooemia of Isaeus preserved by the same writer, and the collection of 56 prooemia ascribed to Demosthenes, amount in all to 209,<sup>2</sup> and of these prooemia 35, or about 17 per cent., contain imperatives. The 174 prooemia that contain no imperatives abound in mollifying substitutes, thus showing that the absence of the imperative is not due to the fact that there was no occasion to use it, but to the fact that it was avoided on account of its harshness of tone and form.<sup>3</sup> One of

<sup>1</sup> [Dem.] 12 is of course excluded from the count.

<sup>2</sup> For the sake of convenience there have been counted among these also the beginnings of those speeches that have no real prooemia. It is further to be noted that Blass (*Att. Bered.* III A, p. 282) makes about 62 prooemia out of the 56 that compose the Demosthenean collection, by dividing some of them with MS authority, but in his edition of Demosthenes only two of the prooemia are divided.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 402.

the more common substitutes is the expression *δέομαι* or *αἰτοῦμαι* with the infinitive. As this is a substitute for the imperative of entreaty, the question at once arises as to why even the imperative of entreaty, the mildest kind of the imperative, should, as a rule, be excluded from the prooemium.

The whole matter becomes clear by considering it from a psychological point of view. The imperative, as has been pointed out above, may be used to express all manner of desire, from the most suppliant entreaty to the most tyrannical command, but it is evident that the imperative, as such, when not attended by a mollifying expression, or when the mental attitude of the person using it is not known, must be harsh. Hence the orator would display very little tact if he were to use even what was intended as a *mild* imperative at the beginning of the speech, for the audience knows nothing, as yet, of the mental attitude of the speaker, and the speaker does not know how his hearers feel toward him. They may be perfectly disinterested or positively prejudiced against him, and it would be but an act of prudence on his part to assume that they would be unprepared for a form that was capable of such harsh interpretation. The case is, of course, different when the orator and the audience are well acquainted and a matter affecting the welfare of the hearers is to be discussed. A well-known patriot might on such an occasion indulge in an imperative in the prooemium without giving offence, but even here, if the urgency of the case did not demand it, as in the military harangues of Demosthenes at Pylos (Thuc. 4, 10) and Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. 5, 9), he would hardly be guilty of using it at the very beginning. Letters also, for the most part, form a legitimate exception to the rule. In a friendly letter the correspondents are supposed to be on familiar terms, and the tone of the letter may be quite as easy as that of a conversation would be. The *εὐνοία* is there, and the *πρόσῃσις* and the *εὐμάθεια* may at times be considerably helped by the use of an imperative. Accordingly, one need not be surprised at finding that a number of the letters in the *Epistolographi Graeci* begin with the imperative, positive as well as negative. To be sure, if the letter is more formal, if the writer's interests are involved, the tone of the letter will vary. Isocrates, Ep. 2, may serve as a specimen of such a letter. The letter is written to Philip. It consists of two parts. In the entire first part (§§1-13), which is in reality only an introduction to the other part, there is not a single imperative, though

there are a number of mollifying substitutes, and the second part, though introduced by the words *πειρατέον παρακαλέσαι σε*, contains but two imperatives, the *πράκλεισις* being made by means of substitutes for the imperative.

After this preliminary discussion of the theory of the use of the imperative in the prooemium, it will be well to scrutinize the facts somewhat more in detail. The following is a brief account of the exceptions to the rule in the ten Attic orators. In questions of authorship, Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*,<sup>1</sup> has been followed. ANT. 3 γ, the common reading is *δέομαι ὑμῶν μὴ πεισθέντες ἡγήσασθε*, but N, according to Maetzner, has *πεισθέντας* and *ἡγήσασθαι* respectively, and this is undoubtedly the correct reading. Cf., however, Ps.-Dem. 50 (see below).—LYS. 19. Prooemium §§1, 2-6, 7-10, 11. §7 *ἐνθυμείσθε* and §10 *μὴ οὖν προκαταγινώσκετε*.—ISOC. 4. *προειρήσθω* in §14 at the end of the third part of the prooemium. Or. 5 begins with *μὴ θαυμάσης* (see also below, p. 432, line 16). Or. 6 *μηδεὶς οὖν ὑμᾶς πείσῃ* in §10 at the close of the second part of the prooemium.—ISAE. 1. Prooemium §§1-2, 3-5, 6-7; the first and third parts aim at *εὐνοία*, the second at *εὐμάθεια*; hence the imperative *σκέψασθε* at the beginning of §3. Or. 5, prooemium §§1-4; the real prooemium consists of §1 and contains no imperative; §2 *ἀνάγνωθι (dis)*; §4 *ἀποδειξάτωσαν, μαρτυρήσατω, ἀνάγνωθι*; on this curiously constructed prooemium see Blass, *Att. Bered.* Fr. 15 (Sch.), imperative *ἀκούσατε* in §1. Dionysius de Isaeo, §7, says of this prooemium: *παρὰ δὲ Ἰσαίῳ κατεσκεύασται τὸ δοκοῦν εἶναι ἀφελές καὶ οὐ λήθην ὅτι ἐστὶ ῥητορικόν*. Isaeus evidently tries to be *ἀφελής* by being brief,<sup>2</sup> but seems to have mistaken rapidity for brevity. Rapidity, however, is apt, on the one hand, to involve abruptness, and, on the other, to engender excessive *περιβολή* or *μεστότης*.<sup>3</sup> Isaeus has fallen into both errors. The *μεστότης* of this passage is brought about by the heaping up of the genitive absolute and the use of the additional nominative participle *μεταπεμφάμενος*, and the abruptness is marked by the use of the imperative, among other things. Lysias, in the prooemium

<sup>1</sup> Except in the case of Dem., where Blass' text edition of Dem. has been followed.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the *μικρὰ δέ μου ἀκούσατε* and the heaping up of the genitive absolute.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gildersleeve, *Stylistic Eff. of Greek Ptc.*, A. J. P. IX 144: "*περιβολή*, then, may have a rapidity, but it is the rapidity of a current. It is only when the current is choked, when the multiplication of participles becomes confusing, it is only then that we have *μεστότης* or *plethora* of style. This is *περιβολή overdone*."



cited by Dionysius (l. c., §6), is not in such a hurry. He avoids a harsh imperative by taking the time to say ἀναγκαῖόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, περὶ τῆς φιλίας τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ τῆς Φερενίκου πρῶτον εἰπεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, and so, to use the words of Dionysius, a "ῥδέϊα ἐισβολή" is secured.—DEM. 9. §3 σκοπεῖτε γὰρ ὧδί. The prooemium, according to Blass, III A, p. 331 sq., is divided into three parts. One of the scholiasts does not reckon the third part (in which the imperative occurs) as part of the prooemium. At any rate, the sentence preceding the imperative<sup>1</sup> indirectly contains the apology for the use of σκοπεῖτε. Or. 21. Two prooemia §§1-4 and §§5-8. Two imperatives in §8 at the end of the second prooemium. But this speech was not delivered and not carefully worked out (cf. Blass, l. c., p. 287). Or. 23 begins with μηδεὶς ὑμῶν . . . νομίση, and in §5 εἶ ἵστε is found. See also below, p. 432, line 19. Or. 25. Imperative σκοπεῖτε in §3 in the second prooemium. Or. 41. Prooemium §§1-2. Imperative at the end of the prooemium. PROOEMIA. Of the Dem. collection the following prooemia contain one or more imperatives respectively: 2, 18, 34, 35, 36, 41, 45, 53, 54. The imperative is nowhere found at the beginning.—PS.-DEM. 10. Imperative λογισάσθω (§2) in the third prooemium. Or. 13. §2, minatory εἰ with the future indicative followed by ὁρᾶτε μήποθ' . . . νομίσητε. Or. 34. ἀκριβῶς ἵστε used parenthetically in §2. Or. 35. Prooemium §§1-2, 3-4, 5. No imperative until the end of §5, where βοηθεῖτε is used for βοηθεῖν, which would be necessary if perfect symmetry was desired. Or. 48. §2 εἶ ἵστε, but §3 δέομαι ὅν ὑμῶν with three participles and three infinitives. Or. 49. Prooemium ("weitschweifig," Blass, p. 464) §§1-5. The speech begins with μηδενὶ ὑμῶν ἄπιστον γενέσθω, and in §5 θανμάση δὲ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν is found. See also below, p. 432, line 20. Or. 50. Prooemium §§1, 2-3. §2 δέομαι ὑμῶν μή με ἡγήσησθε, and ἐξελεγχάτω. §3 ἀναμνήσθητε καὶ . . . φράζεστε, preceded by the expression δέομαι ὑμῶν ἀπάντων δικαίαν δέσιν. Or. 53. §1 ἔστω τεκμήριον. The imperative might have been avoided by the use of some such expression as ἀξιώ ὑμᾶς (δέομαι ὑμῶν) τοῦτο ποιεῖσθαι τεκμήριον. Or. 59. Strictly speaking, no exception. §1 is the prooemium of the speech of Theomnestos. The whole speech of Theomnestos, §§1-15, is the prooemium of the speech of Apollodorus. There is no imperative in the prooemium of the first speech, nor in the introduction of the συνηγορία. The imperative σκοπεῖτε occurs in §11.—HYP. 2.

<sup>1</sup> ἀξιώ δ' ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἂν τι τῶν ἀληθῶν μετὰ παρρησίας λέγω, μηδεμίαν μοι διὰ τοῦτο παρ' ὑμῶν ὀργὴν γενέσθαι.

Fr. 1 (Bl.), according to Blass, l. c., III B, p. 62, contains what there is left of the prooemium. In line 3 *ἐᾶτε* is probably imperative. In lines 6-7 *καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν | ἀπαντάτω* is used, and in lines 9-10 *μηδὲ | προστίθετε*. Owing to the fragmentary nature of the prooemium, it would not be safe to pronounce judgment upon it, but from all appearances it is saucy to the last degree.—LYCURG. Prooemium §1 to beginning of §16. *εὖ . . . ἴστε*, §10 and §15.—AESCHIN. 3. Prooemium §§1-9 *προειρῆσθαι*. §6 *μηδεὶς—ἀγνοεῖτω ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἕκαστος ἐπιστάσθω*. §7 *αἰσχύνθητε*. §8 *αἰσχυνόμενοι καὶ . . . μεμνημένοι . . . λύετε . . . βεβαιούτε . . . κολάζετε*. The hypothesis says: *μέμφαιτο δ' ἂν τις τὸ προοίμιον ὡς τραγικὸν καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ἐπιλόγῃ μᾶλλον εὐικός*. The prooemium resembles an epilogue in this respect at least, that it contains a large number of imperatives.—DIN. 2. Prooemium §§1-4. Blass, III B, p. 283, thinks that this speech was the principal speech against Aristogeiton, but that the nature of the circumstances was such as to make the speech resemble a *δευτερολογία*. From the point of view of the use of the imperative, it resembles an epilogue (cf. Aeschin. 3 above). So §4 *ἀποκτείνετε . . . καὶ . . . ἐκκόψατ'*. Cf. also the string of imperatives in §5.

From the above account it appears that Antiphon has no certain exception to the rule of the avoidance of the imperative in the prooemium. Andocides does not violate it. Lysias has but one certain violation in 26 prooemia.<sup>1</sup> Ps.-Lysias has no exception to the rule. Isocrates violates it in 3 out of 18 prooemia. Isaeus runs up his exceptions to a little more than 23 per cent. (3 out of 13). Demosthenes has 14 per cent. of exceptions (5 out of 35) in his orations and 16 per cent. (9 out of 56) in his collection of prooemia. Of the prooemia of the Pseudo-Demosthenean speeches nine out of a total of 25 contain imperatives. Of Hyperides, Lycurgus, Aeschines and Dinarchus, there are not enough prooemia to make the mere percentage of violations have any special significance. Remarkable is the fact that in the earliest of the Attic orators the rule seems to have been stringent in the case of prooemia of not too great a length. The first serious violations occur in Isaeus, and they are a mark of the artificiality of that author. Demosthenes, the master of oratory, uses the imperative to advantage, even in the prooemia. In Hyperides, Aeschines and Dinarchus the fine perception of the harshness of the imperative in the prooemia seems to have been dulled in a

<sup>1</sup> The prooemium of the *ἐρωτικός* is not included in the 26.

measure, and the desire for cheap and boisterous eloquence begins to crop out, especially in Dinarchus.

While it was the rule in Attic oratory to exclude the imperative from the entire prooemium, and while there are only 17 per cent. of exceptions, yet it must be remembered that the important point is that the imperative be kept as far as possible from the beginning of the speech. The longer the prooemium, the more liable we should be to find the imperative. On the other hand, when the matter is urgent and the time allotted for the speech is short, the prooemium is shortened or omitted altogether, and the almost inevitable imperative comes nearer the beginning of the speech, especially if there be no narrative, or at least but a short one. If the 35 exceptions mentioned above be examined in this respect, it will be found that only three speeches—to wit, Isoc. 5, Dem. 23 and Ps.-Dem. 49—begin with an imperative or, rather, with a prohibitive. Isoc. 5 is in reality a long letter, and the prohibitive is not an uncommon beginning for letters, as has been pointed out before. *μὴ θαυμάσης*, likewise, is not a harsh expression. In Dem. 23, *μηδεὶς ὑμῶν νομίση* reflects the inexperience of the speaker, Euthycles, and in this case, as well as in Ps.-Dem. 49, the first object is to remove the strong prejudice existing in the minds of the audience.

It will be well to note, in passing, that the imperative is not found at the beginning of Gorgias' Helena and Palamedes, Antisthenes' Aias and Odysseus, Ps.-Alcidamas' Odysseus, Alcidamas' *περὶ σοφιστῶν*, Ps.-Demades' *ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας*, and the few prooemia, or fragments of prooemia (not included in the above count), that a rapid survey of the fragments in Sauppe's collection enabled the writer to observe. In the list of 40-odd speeches given by Wilkins, Speeches from Thuc., and Jebb in Hellen., p. 322, the imperative occurs only twice in the first sentence of the speech; namely, Thuc. 4, 10 and 5, 9, referred to above, p. 428. An examination of a number of orations of Cicero yielded similar results.

With reference to the theory of the imperative in the body of the speech and in the epilogue, a few remarks will suffice. By the exercise of good judgment at the beginning of the speech, the orator will have secured the attention and the good-will of the audience. At this stage an *ἀκούσατε*, or an *ἐνθυμείσθε*, or a similar imperative may be used without offence. A skilful narrative may win for the speaker the full sympathy of the hearers, and he may

multiply his *σκέψασθε*'s, etc., and when, in the course of his arguments, he has shown the justice of his cause and has kindled the wrath of the jury, he may indulge in one or more vigorous hortative imperatives, urging the jury to mete out the deserved punishment, or his imperatives may assume the milder form of a pathetic appeal for either mercy or revenge.

It follows, from what has been said in the previous section, that the imperatives of such verbs as *ἐνθυμέσθαι*, *σκοπεῖν*, *σκέψασθαι*, *θεωρεῖν*, etc., are used principally in the argumentative parts of the speech, and that the more effective imperatives are used in exhortations and appeals. Appeals and exhortations may be scattered throughout a long speech, but the place for which they are especially adapted is the epilogue. Hence the epilogue is the proper home of the imperative. Of course, there is a great deal of variation even here. So, for example, Lysias has one or more imperatives in the epilogues of 16 orations, but in the epilogues of 11 other orations there are no imperatives, though substitutes occur. There seems to be no special harshness connected with the imperative at the very close of the oration. In Lys. 12 the asyndeton and the imperative make a vigorous close, but the *ἄντις* of Ps.-Dem. *ἐπιτάφιος* and of the funeral oration in Plato *Menex.*, and the *ἀποχωρεῖτε* at the close of Pericles' funeral oration, cannot have been anything but a polite dismissal. Antiphon's tetralogies are interesting, inasmuch as they illustrate very prettily the normal use of the imperative. The imperative is avoided not only in the prooemia of each of the 12 speeches, but also in the entire first speech of each tetralogy. The first speech forms, as it were, a prooemium to the tetralogy. On the other hand, the epilogues of each of the 9 remaining speeches, excepting that of 4 γ, contain imperatives.

With reference to the point from which this whole discussion started—the Greek feeling of the imperative—it may not be amiss, at the close of the investigation, to consider somewhat more in detail the Protagorean criticism of Homer, referred to by Professor Gildersleeve in his introductory note. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not give a full account of the reasons that called forth this criticism. All we know is that Homer was reproved for using a command in saying *μῆνιν ἄειδε*, thinking that he was using a form of prayer. For, says Protagoras, *τὸ κελεύσαι ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπιταγὴς ἐστίν*. Two explanations have been suggested. The one—not a very complimentary one, it must be confessed—is given by such

men as Susemihl, Arist. poet., ad loc.; Wolf, Prolegg. ad Hom., p. clxvii; Bernhardt, Wissensch. Synt. d. griech. Spr., p. 392, and Lersch, Sprachphilosophie, II, p. 200 sq. According to it, Protagoras had just discovered the fact that the form that is grammatically termed the imperative is the proper form to use when a command is to be expressed, and that the optative of the grammars is the proper form to use for the expression of a wish. In his great zeal he utterly lost sight of the fact that the imperative may also express an entreaty and the optative a command, and began to accuse everybody that did not use language in conformity with the rule he had discovered. Even Homer did not escape his criticism. It was, to use the words of Lersch, the "behaglich-stolze Anwendung einer neuen Kunst." The other explanation credits Protagoras with a little more sense. According to this view, Protagoras' division of all language into *εὐχολή*, *ἐρώτησις*, *ἀπόκρισις* and *ἐντολή* is a rhetorical division (cf. Quintilian, III 4, 10), not a grammatical one, and Homer is blamed simply for *beginning* with an imperative. This seems to be the view, at least in part, of such men as Düntzer, Rettung d. arist. Poet., p. 82, and Spengel, σ. τ., p. 44 sq. It may perhaps never be possible to arrive at the exact truth of the matter, but, in view of the rule of the Attic orators to exclude the imperative from the beginning of the speech, it would seem that the second explanation comes nearer the truth. Protagoras was more or less of a rhetorician. Why not, then, according to Prof. Gildersleeve's view, give Protagoras the benefit of the doubt, and look upon his criticism as proceeding from an oratorical or a rhetorical point of view? This certainly is the most satisfactory solution of the problem, and until valid proofs to the contrary are offered, it may be safe to maintain that, to the mind of Protagoras, the terms *εὐχολή* and *ἐντολή* did not convey the same meaning as attaches to the later technical terms *εὐκτική* and *προστακτική*. The *εὐχολή* and the *ἐντολή* are determined by the sense, and not by the form. It is Homer's rhetoric that is criticised, not his grammar.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> That Protagoras' criticism made a lasting impression is shown by the fact that even the late scholiast finds it necessary to defend his poet for having used the imperative *ἄειδε*. Cf. Dind., Sch. Gr. in Hom. II. I, p. 4: *ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἤτοι ἄδειαν ἢ συνήθειαν λαμβάνει τὰ προστακτικὰ ἀντὶ εὐκτικῶν· καὶ γὰρ Ἡσίοδος φησὶ "δεῦτε δὴ ἐννέπετε," καὶ Πίνδαρος "μαντεύεο Μοῦσα," καὶ Ἀντίμαχος ὁ Κολοφώνιος "ἐννέπετε Κρονίδαο Διὸς μεγάλοιο θύγατρης." δευτέρον δὲ, ὅτι οὐ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ταῖς Μοῖσαις ἐπιτάσσουσιν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῖς.*

The results of the study of the limitation of the imperative in the Attic orators, as recorded in the above pages, may, in conclusion, be summed up as follows:—

It may be roughly said that there are three kinds of imperatives—imperatives expressing a command, hortative imperatives and imperatives of entreaty. Of these three classes, the first, owing to its unmitigated harshness, is not represented among the number of the effective imperatives, whilst the use of imperatives of the second class, and even of the third, which is almost free from harshness, is permitted only under certain restrictions.

So far as the use of the positive and the negative, and so far as the use of the tenses is concerned, the greater harshness, whether real or imaginary, of one form as compared with another seems to have given rise to no rhetorical limitations. For, on the one hand, the small number of prohibitions is due to the lack of occasion to use these forms more frequently, and, on the other hand, not only is the proportion of aorist and present the same for commands and prohibitions, but  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive, which is by nature adapted for the expression of a mild imperative, occurs less frequently than  $\mu\eta$  with the present imperative. As for the origin of  $\mu\eta$  with the aorist subjunctive, the writer agrees with Delbrück in thinking that it is not psychological, but historical, though he differs with him as to the manner of accounting for it on this basis. According to the writer's view, this peculiar prohibitive expression must be traced back to the use of  $m\tilde{a}$  with the aorist injunctive.

Though there are no limitations as to the form of the imperative, the other limitations as to its use are all the more strongly marked. In the first place, the numbers of the imperative are considerably reduced by the use of mollifying substitutes, even the imperative of entreaty being frequently replaced by  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$  with the infinitive, or some similar expression. In the second place, the constant recurrence of imperative forms of the same verb, and the varying usage of the departments, and of the authors and of the individual speeches, show that the imperative, when used, is used largely under stress of circumstances, and even then it is frequently attended by some unmistakable mollifying expression. Lastly, the distribution of the imperative in the speech was made in strict conformity with the views of the ancients as to the functions of the different parts of the oration. For the humble tone of the prooemium is marked by the complete absence of the imperative,

the calm reflection of the argumentative parts is pictured by the mild hortative forms *ἐνθυμείσθε*, *σκοπεῖτε* and the like, and the passion or the pathos of the epilogue is marked by the presence of one or more vigorous hortative imperatives or by the use of one or more imperatives of entreaty.<sup>1</sup> In fine, the whole investigation seems to be a complete vindication of the views of the ancient rhetoricians. It justifies the doctrine of Hermogenes as to the harsh tone of the imperative, and makes Protagoras' well-known criticism of Homer at least comprehensible.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Walz, Rh. Gr. VII 1, p. 33: *ἔργον ῥήτορος, ὥς φησι Θεοδέκτης, προοιμιάσασθαι πρὸς εὐνοίαν, διηγῆσασθαι πρὸς πιθανότητα, πιστώσασθαι πρὸς πειθῶ, ἐπιλογίσασθαι πρὸς ὀργὴν ἢ ἔλεον.*